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DEBT TO SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF FINES & FEES REFORM IN
DISMANTLING THE CARCERAL STATE
Wesley Dozier & Daniel Kiel∗
ABSTRACT
Fines and fees that result from contact with the criminal legal system serve as a
suffocating debt for those against whom they are assessed. Many states have countless
laws that require taxes, fines, and fees to be assessed against individuals involved in the
criminal legal system at various stages of the criminal legal process, and they have the
effect of permanently trapping individuals within the system. In Tennessee, for example,
these debts, which can accumulate to over $10,000 in a single criminal case, stand in
the way of individuals getting their criminal records expunged, keeping valid driver’s
licenses, and restoring their voting rights, among other things. However, as in many
other states, Tennessee’s legislature is decidedly hostile to the poor (particularly when
poor people’s issues compete with the perceived financial health of government entities),
and the urgency of the problem cannot wait for unwilling lawmakers to realize the
change that thousands of people need. Using Tennessee as a case study and drawing on
the author’s experiences working within the State’s system, this Article considers ways
to effectively advocate for the elimination of court debt as a punishment for poverty.
First, it provides an abbreviated history of court debt and explains how that history still
impacts individuals today. This Article also draws upon the author’s experiences
representing individuals in court, appearing before judges, and collaborating with other
stakeholders to show the difficulty of achieving a state-wide movement for reform in
Tennessee’s current political climate, a problem not unique to this state. Finally, the
Article concludes by discussing how local actors can work within current legal
frameworks to protect people from extortionist fine and fee policies and limit the harmful
growth of the criminal legal system.
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INTRODUCTION
Mr. Smith is an African-American man living in Memphis, Tennes-
see. He lives with his three children and girlfriend, all of whom he sup-
ports financially. Unfortunately, because of a charge that Mr. Smith
picked up in his early twenties, he was fired by his employer, a local in-
surance company. The manager at the insurance company explicitly told
Mr. Smith that she would rehire him if he could get this charge off of his
record. Fortunately for Mr. Smith, the charge on his record—theft of
property, $500 or below—is one that can be removed under Tennessee
state law. In this regard, Mr. Smith is one of relatively few people who
have criminal charges that are expungement-eligible.1 To get the charge
removed from his record, however, Mr. Smith would have to pay more
than $10,000, the total amount of fines and fees assessed against him as
a result of his criminal charge and the subsequent criminal process. This,
for a theft of less than $500.
In this respect, Mr. Smith is far from alone. In Tennessee and across
the country, individuals who come into contact with the criminal legal
system are required to pay exorbitant sums of money after the comple-
tion of their criminal punishments.2 These fees stand apart from and in
addition to any punishment imposed, financial or otherwise. In Tennes-
see, no assessment is made as to whether the individual is able to pay
before these fines and fees are applied.3 While the state, under the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, ostensibly cannot put
1. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101 (2021) (illustrating a severely limited list of eligible Class
E felonies and strict requirements for eligibility after a certain date, while remaining silent as to
waiting periods for eligibility, fees an individual must pay, and the number of offenses one can
have).
2. See Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt and Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons,
75 MD. L. REV. 486, 508 (2016) (noting that “[c]ourts have imposed legal financial obligations on
‘[66%] of felons sentenced to prison, and more than [80%] of other felons and misdemeanants.’”)
(quoting Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as Misguided
Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 515 (2011).
3. See JENNIFER BARRIE, TYLER CARPENTER, LEAH ELDRIDGE & TERESA GIBSON, TENN. ADVISORY
COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., TENNESSEE’S COURT FEES AND TAXES: FUNDING THE COURTS
FAIRLY 27–28 (2017), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tacir/documents/2017_CourtFees.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y4NK-W4WH] [hereinafter TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT].
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someone like Mr. Smith in jail for his failure to pay,4 many states have
found loopholes to this constitutional bar, such as contempt of court
charges.5 Additionally, there remains a host of negative repercussions
that flow from having outstanding court debt, as if the criminal punish-
ment itself was not enough. In Tennessee, individuals with outstanding
court debt cannot get their criminal records expunged,6 cannot vote,7
and can have their licenses suspended.8 Additionally, commercial data-
bases allow businesses, such as apartment leasers, to search and discover
people’s criminal histories and, thus, discriminate against them on that
basis. The consequences of this practice are immeasurable.9
For the past year, I10 have worked on the issue of court debt as a result
of contact with the criminal legal system in Memphis as an Equal Justice
Works11 fellow at Just City.12 My work approaches the issue from multiple
angles, including representing individuals in court by bringing petitions
to have their fines and fees waived. In fact, Mr. Smith was a client of
mine.13 He diligently sought out my services, and we successfully peti-
tioned the court to waive almost all of his court debt. His record has now
been expunged, and he has moved on with his life. While this is a good
4. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,
666–69 (1983).
5. ALEXANDRA BASTIEN, POLICYLINK, ENDING THE DEBT TRAP: STRATEGIES TO STOP THE ABUSE
OF COURT-IMPOSED FINES AND FEES 3 (2017), https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/ending-
the-debt-trap-03-28-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9VG-YLKB].
6. See § 40-32-101.
7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202 (2021). With regard to voting, the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the Constitution was not violated by requiring individuals to pay fines and fees before having
voting rights restored despite a state constitutional amendment in Florida easing restoration.
Jones v. Governor of Florida, 975 F.3d 1016, 1080–81 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Johnson v. Bredesen,
624 F.3d 742, 746–50 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also Thompson v. Merrill, No. 16-CV-783, 2020 WL
7080308, *21–22 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 2020) (granting summary judgment in favor of state on plain-
tiffs’ wealth discrimination claim on lines consistent with Jones).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-105 (2021).
9. See Vidhi S. Joshi, Sentenced to Debt: The True Cost of Raising Revenue Through Tennessee’s
Criminal Court, 53 TENN. BAR J. 18, 20–21 (2017) (listing various repercussions of court debt in
Tennessee).
10. First person narrative throughout the Article references author Wesley Dozier’s experi-
ences.
11. See Become a Fellow: Follow Your Passion for Equal Justice, EQUAL JUST. WORKS, https://
www.equaljusticeworks.org/become-a-fellow/ [https://perma.cc/5LPU-66AM] (last visited Mar.
28, 2021) (“Candidates for an Equal Justice Works Fellowship can create a Fellowship project of
their own design or can apply to join an established Fellowship program dedicated to serving a
specific population or addressing an unmet legal need.”).
12. Our Mission, JUST CITY MEMPHIS, https://justcity.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/GL4K-
JPV4] (last visited Mar. 28, 2021) (“Our mission is to advance policies and programs within Shelby
County and the State of Tennessee that strengthen the right to counsel and mitigate the damage
caused to families and neighborhoods as a result of contact with the criminal justice system.”).
13. Name changed for the purposes of this article.
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outcome for Mr. Smith, the complexity and arbitrariness of this process
reveals deep flaws in how fines and fees prevent those who have com-
pleted their punishment from fully returning to society.
The other part of my work focuses on pushing for policy change. I
strategize with other stakeholders on policy initiatives that can be imple-
mented in Tennessee, or at least in Shelby County, to avoid burdening
individuals who cannot afford to pay their court debt. In a state like Ten-
nessee, however, where the legislature has increased financial burdens
on the criminalized poor14 and has not shown enthusiasm for legislation
that would aid those in poverty,15 a state-wide initiative to change the
substantive law regarding fines and fees is a nonstarter.16 As a result,
debt-burdened individuals and their advocates are left fighting local bat-
tles and skirmishes in individual courtrooms. Our policy efforts focus on
the discretion that individual judges have to waive these costs.17 We also
deliberate on more creative solutions to the problem, seeking out local
partners interested in helping people pay otherwise insurmountable
court costs.
In this Article, I will reflect on my and other advocates’ efforts over
the past year to relieve some of the most vulnerable members of our com-
munity of the burden of criminal court debt. My perspective highlights
both the struggle to push for changes in policy under conditions where
the change we seek is unlikely, and the creative alternatives we rely on to
provide relief for vulnerable people. I will start with an overview of the
fines and fees policies in Tennessee to provide some historical grounding
and a glimpse into what these policies mean for individuals and govern-
ment entities today. Then, I will turn to solutions that I and others have
tried, and are trying, with hopes of relieving individuals of their court
debt burdens.
14. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing increasing costs between
2005–2017).
15. See, e.g., Joel Ebert, Republican-Sponsored Medicaid Expansion Bill Halted for the Year in Ten-
nessee Legislature, TENNESSEAN (Mar. 11, 2020, 5:16 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news
/politics/2020/03/11/tennessee-medicaid-expansion-bill-halted-year-ron-travis/5024454002/ [https://
perma.cc/B9SK-7SN3] (highlighting a failure to expand Medicaid); State Minimum Wage Laws, Ten-
nessee, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/state#tn [https://
perma.cc/XVE2-BH9Q] (last updated May 1, 2021) (noting a lack of state minimum wage law).
16. Rather than decreasing legal financial obligations, Tennessee has instead passed more
than sixty statutes to institute new fees or increase existing fees and taxes for criminal cases. See
TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 119 (listing each statute passed between 2005 and
2017); see also Tenn. H.B. 0880, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017) (unenacted legislation
that would have established the court fee and tax advisory council), https://finesandfeesjustice-
center.org/articles/tennessee-house-bill-880-creates-the-court-fee-and-tax-advisory-council/
[https://perma.cc/F4KC-DWHR].
17. Joshi, supra note 9, at 21 (“Tennessee statutes provide judges with full discretion to de-
termine whether a person is entitled to a reduction or waiver.”).
SUMMER 2021] Debt to Society 861
I. FINES & FEES IN TENNESSEE
Rising fines and fees is a phenomenon that has occurred across the
country.18 As more people have been ensnared in the grips of the criminal
legal system’s hold, states have scrambled to sufficiently resource these
systems to accommodate increased “use.”19 This is true in Tennessee.20
Between 2005 and 2017, the Tennessee General Assembly passed forty-
six bills that increased the amount of debt owed by individuals who make
contact with the criminal legal system.21 These increases have taken the
form of taxes, fines, and fees.22 Taxes are set amounts imposed with the
purpose of raising government revenue.23 Fines are “monetary penalties
for violations of the law.”24 Fees are “moneys paid for services rendered
by court or law enforcement personnel.”25
Court debt is triggered at various phases of the criminal legal pro-
cess, becoming due at the case’s disposition. For example, a person that
is pulled over in Tennessee is assessed a five-dollar fee if they receive a
18. Sobol, supra note 2, at 519–20; Bastien, supra note 5, at 2; Judith Resnick & David Marcus,
Inability to Pay: Court Debt Circa 2020, 98 N.C. L. Rev. 361, 363 (2020); see also ACLU, In for a Penny:
The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons (2010), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field
_document/InForAPenny_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GXX-GM7T] (profiling the proliferation
of legal financial obligations in five states). Other jurisdictions have seen policy efforts aimed at
reducing such debt, such as San Francisco and Alameda County, California, which have eliminated
local government fees, and New Orleans, which has eliminated fees within its juvenile justice sys-
tem. In 2018, Metro Nashville eliminated its daily jail fee and daily pretrial release fee. Samantha
Max, Report Urges Nashville to Cut Back on Criminal Justice Fines and Fees, WPLN News-Nashville
Pub. Radio (Nov. 5, 2020), https://wpln.org/post/report-urges-nashville-to-cut-back-on-criminal-
justice-fines-and-fees/ [https://perma.cc/7YK7-TCUR].
19. In its investigation into the police department of Ferguson, Missouri, in the wake of the
shooting of Michael Brown, the U.S. Department of Justice lamented the use of the police depart-
ment as a source of revenue generation. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–12 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files
/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5PVY-LHM3]; see CTR. FOR JUST. & SAFETY FIN., REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRIMINAL
FINES & FEES 6 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f0735ceb487f10af7ea8372/t
/5fa45f0e5ffd6d20eca39e3d/1604607760901/Fines+and+Fees_Final+Report_Nashville-Davidson+
County.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YJU-365H] [hereinafter NASHVILLE FINES & FEES REPORT] (noting a
2018 National League of Cities Report that states, “[a]s has been the case for much of the past two
decades, the most common action taken to boost city revenues, regardless of broader economic
trends, has been to increase fees charged for services.”).
20. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 12.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see TENN. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., LEGAL FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS IN THE TENNESSEE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4–5 (2019), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs
/2020/01-15-TN-LFO-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE6K-8PKA] (providing an overview of fines
and fees in Tennessee) [hereinafter LFOS IN THE TENN. CRIM. JUST. SYS.].
25. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
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traffic citation resulting in a conviction under TCA § 55-10-207, a fee
birthed out of one of the forty-six bills passed between 2005-2017 that
increased or added new court fees and taxes.26 Though the five dollars
assessed is relatively little compared to other fines, fees, and taxes as-
sessed, it is only the first drop in the bucket of court debt that will accrue
over the life of a case. Defendants that have been jailed pre-trial are as-
sessed jail fees,27 which toll daily.28 Some types of criminal charges incur
fees if the defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty.29 Clerk fees are as-
sessed on each defendant’s case.30 In some jurisdictions, fees are charged
when indigent defendants secure the assistance of a public defender.31
Fees are even charged for a defendant to get her criminal record ex-
punged.32 At every turn in this criminal process—from the first step of
receiving a citation to the very last step of getting a conviction removed
from one’s criminal record—the assessment of fines, fees, and taxes is
triggered. These amounts can be small, like the five-dollar fee assessed
for receiving a citation, or they can be large, like the seventy-five-dollar
fee assessed for pleading or being convicted of certain drug crimes. Even
the most minor offense can burden a defendant with a substantial
amount of court debt.33
A. Measuring the Scope of Fines and Fees
The Tennessee Code describes the amounts of fees, taxes, and fines,
as well as when they are applied and how they should be distributed.34
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-207(e)(1) (2021); TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3,
at 2, 38.
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-26-105 (2021).
28. Item No. 21, Shelby Cnty. Comm’n, A Resolution to Fix the Jailer’s Fee of Shelby County,
Tennessee and to Establish a Budgetary Funding Method for the County Jail in Lieu of Fees for
Individual Prisoners (Apr. 7, 1997) (on file with author); see Samantha Max, supra note 18.
29. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-22-109 (2021) (for fees specific to drug-related offenses).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-21-401 (2021).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-210 (2021).
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(a)(1)(B), (i) (2021) (giving authority to local clerks to set and
charge expungement fees). While the state eliminated some of its expungement fees, local clerks
are still allowed to set and charge their own fees. See 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts 200.
33. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (“Even for a relatively minor offense
such as driving with a revoked, suspended, or canceled license, the costs charged in general ses-
sions criminal court could include up to 17 separate fees and taxes totaling a minimum of approx-
imately $112 to over $300.”). See Elizabeth Forester, Impact of Criminal Justice Debt on Indigent De-
fendants in Tennessee, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 253, 264–65 (2020) (providing a list of various types
of fees in Tennessee).
34. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-21-401, 40-14-210, 40-32-101, 55-10-207 (2021).
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Keeping track of the breadth of this practice, however, is difficult.35 Nei-
ther the State of Tennessee nor its counties have a standardized or relia-
ble way of calculating how much revenue each county brings in from
court costs or the extent to which these costs fund the courts.36 One
county report, however, gives a helpful glimpse into just how much rev-
enue is generated by court costs. In 2018, the Shelby County General Ses-
sions Court-Criminal Division, one of the largest General Sessions
Courts in the state, brought in $6,106,644.48 from taxes, fines, and fees.37
This information is obviously helpful for what it shows—the total
amount of revenue that this particular county court generated from
court debt in 2018. But it is also telling for what it does not show. Across
the state, there is limited data demonstrating the total amount of court
debt that has been assessed against individuals that have contact with
the criminal legal system.38 Thus, it is not apparent how much $6 million
in 2018 is relative to the presumably larger amount of court debt owed.
The limited statewide data that do exist similarly suggest that the
amount of court debt paid pales in comparison to the amount assessed.
A 2016 survey of court clerks in Tennessee asked the clerks for the amount
of court debt assessed and receipted in their courts.39 The results re-
vealed that only an estimated 45% of debt from the criminal division of
general sessions courts across the state was actually collected.40 It is es-
timated that between the criminal division of the general sessions
courts, the state Criminal Court, and the state Juvenile Court,41 only 30%
of all criminal debt was actually collected.42 A 2011–2012 report on court
fees, fines, and costs suggested that the percentage yielded on court
35. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 18; see also NASHVILLE FINES & FEES
REPORT, supra note 19, at 2 (“The result of this complex system is that most governments do not
know the total number and dollars of fines and fees assessed, collected, and distributed in their
criminal justice system.”).
36. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
37. SHELBY CNTY. GEN. SESSIONS CT., CRIM. DIV., MONTHLY FEES FY2018 (2018) (on file with
author).
38. See TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 18, 35. One report estimated an
outstanding balance of debt owed to the Shelby County Criminal Court as high as $555 million
from 1995–2015.
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id.
41. In Tennessee, the criminal division of the General Sessions Court is a statutorily author-
ized court that handles certain parts of felony cases and adjudicates misdemeanor cases. The state
circuit courts are constitutionally created courts of general jurisdiction that handle criminal cases.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-10-101, 16-15-401 (2021); TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; About General Sessions
Courts, TENN. STATE CTS., https://www.tncourts.gov/courts/general-sessions-courts/about
[https://perma.cc/R5WL-CYJN] (last visited May 18, 2021).
42. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 (citing Appendix J at 149–63).
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costs assessed was even lower.43 That report details that out of a little over
$39 million assessed, the Shelby County Criminal Court received only
about $2.5 million, a mere 6%.44 Marginally better, the Shelby County
General Sessions Court-Criminal Division assessed almost $29 million
on individuals and only received about $6 million, or around 21%.45 Over-
all, the State of Tennessee assessed a grand total of $259,293,424.81 in
criminal court (general sessions-criminal division, criminal court, and
juvenile court) costs in 2011–2012 and received $77,649,708.47 in pay-
ments, a 29.95% yield.46 Despite the absence of systematic reporting
across the state, the data that does exist overwhelming supports the
claim that Tennessee’s criminal courts are assessing large sums of money
on its residents and that the state is collecting a substantial amount,
though only a fraction of what has been assessed.47 These residents, as
Section C shows, are most often those who cannot afford additional
debt.48
B. Evaluating the Underlying Purpose of
Imposing Fines and Fees
The abysmal return rates that local courts experience highlight the
failure of assessing court costs on individuals as a policy and a practice.
State legislatures justify placing this massive debt burden on their citi-
zens with the idea that those individuals who “use” the criminal legal sys-
tem should bear some of the costs associated with its “use.”49 The past
forty years have seen a massive increase in the use of fines and fees
within the criminal legal system. That growth has been explained by fi-
nancial stresses on the system coming from two directions. On one hand,
mass incarceration has substantially increased the number of individu-
als in prison or otherwise ensnared in the system, thus increasing costs
to states. At the same time, state and local budgets have been squeezed,
leaving policymakers in search of alternative forms of revenue.50 So-
called offender-based funding has been utilized to close the gap.51
43. Id. at 163; see also NASHVILLE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 19, at 8 (noting that Metro
Nashville General Sessions and Criminal Court judges waived 56% of assessed fines and fees in
FY2018, up from 34% in FY2015).
44. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 161.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 161–63.
48. See Id.
49. BASTIEN, supra note 5, at 3.
50. See Sobol, supra note 2, at 508–09.
51. Sobol, supra note 2, at 509 n.191 (citing reports from the ACLU and Human Rights
Watch).
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According to Human Rights Watch, some localities expect their criminal
court operations to be fully funded through fines and fees extracted from
the very individuals caught up in the system.52
Fees, in particular, skyrocketed. Between 1991 and 2004, the percent-
age of individuals with felony convictions who were assessed fees in-
creased from approximately 10% to over 50%.53 These fees take a wide va-
riety of forms and are assessed by agencies throughout the system, but
they are consistent in their justification as a cost-shifting scheme. For
example, Ohio’s “pay-to-stay” program, which charges individuals
housed in Ohio prisons something akin to room and board, has been pro-
moted as a way to “offset the costs associated with the housing of [of-
fenders].”54 Shifting funding from the state to offenders themselves was
said to recognize “the importance of offender accountability” and relieve
the “increasing tax burden on the citizens of Northwest Ohio” caused by
mass incarceration.55
It is not difficult to see the political attractiveness of programs like
that in Ohio. Rather than raising revenue through taxes or shifting re-
sources from other government programs, lawmakers can simply make
those already ensnared in the system foot the bill. At least in theory, this
cost-shifting transfers the financial obligations of mass incarceration
onto those populations that constituents are told are the primary cause
for it: offenders themselves. This temptation is compounded by the fact
that so many of those labeled as offenders have their voting rights sus-
pended, potentially making them politically invisible to elected lawmak-
ers. In sum, moving to a “user-funded” model for the criminal legal sys-
tem purports to solve a fiscal problem, has political advantages, and is
far easier to sell to constituents than alternatives. The entire premise,
however, is flawed.
C. Upending the Justification for Imposing Fines and Fees
To describe individuals who make contact with the criminal legal
system as “users” misunderstands how the criminal legal system func-
tions from beginning to end. In Tennessee, an estimated 75% of people
52. Human Rts. Watch, Profiting for Probation: America’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry
(Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05/profiting-probation/americas-offender-funded-
probation-industry [https://perma.cc/LDD7-KEGH].
53. Sobol, supra note 2, at 510 (citing Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett,
Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J.
SOCIO.1753, 1756 (2010)).
54. Katherine Porter, A “Debt” to Society?: Reassessing the Constitutionality of Pay-to-Stay Programs
in Ohio’s Jails and Prisons, 44 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 415, 417 (2018).
55. Id.
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charged with criminal offenses are indigent.56 Additionally, African
Americans are overrepresented in Tennessee’s criminal legal system.57
These same communities are also over-surveilled and over-policed, lead-
ing them to have more contact with the criminal legal system.58 Thus, the
“user-funded” model does not rightfully place costs on those who are
processed through the system, because those who are processed through
the system are most often targeted by said system. In this way, the “user-
funded” model simply perpetuates the disparities that are widely known
to exist in the criminal system: by putting vulnerable people in a more
precarious condition by burdening them with court debt that they cannot
pay.59
The data also support this conclusion. Individuals that have court
debt assessed against them experience life-altering consequences as a
result of nonpayment. Tennesseans with outstanding court debt cannot
have their criminal records expunged.60 Additionally, individuals with
outstanding court debt cannot have their voting rights restored,61 and
can have their driver’s licenses revoked.62 Ironically, many of these con-
sequences, specifically ineligibility for expungement and driver’s license
suspension, only perpetuate the difficulty those with criminal records
have in reentering society.63 If the State of Tennessee wants individuals
to pay court costs, those individuals need jobs that will provide them with
the financial resources that will enable them to pay their court debt. With
convictions on their criminal records, however, it is very difficult for
people to find jobs that will provide them with enough income to pay
their bills, let alone their court costs.64 In my work, I have encountered
56. TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 30.
57. Tennessee Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/TN.html
[https://perma.cc/GV92-M95U] (last visited May 5, 2021).
58. See SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE U.S.
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-dis-
parities/ [https://perma.cc/BSQ6-36LC]; see also Joshi, supra note 9, at 20 (noting that African
Americans are 4.5 times more likely to be arrested and 3.7 times more likely to be incarcerated
than white individuals in Tennessee, an arrest disparity that is larger than nearby states).
59. See BASTIEN, supra note 5, at 2. The Nashville Fines & Fees Report describes this as a
policy of “High Pain, Low Gain,” because the revenue generated is relatively small, while the bur-
den on individuals and families of outstanding debt is significant. NASHVILLE FINES & FEES
REPORT, supra note 19, at 11.
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101 (2021).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202 (2021).
62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-105 (2021).
63. See LFOS IN THE TENN. CRIM. JUST. SYS., supra note 24, at 16. See generally Robinson v.
Purkey, No. 17-cv-01263, 2018 WL 5023330, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 2018), rev’d and remanded sub
nom., Robinson v. Long, 814 F. App’x 991 (6th Cir. 2020).
64. See LFOS IN THE TENN. CRIM. JUST. SYS., supra note 24, at 13–17 (detailing findings of an
investigation into the consequences of outstanding fees and debt on individuals attempting to re-
enter society after contact with the criminal justice system).
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countless people who are eligible for expungement under Tennessee’s
expungement statute but are barred from expungement because of the
exorbitant costs that stand in their way. Additionally, suspending a per-
son’s driver’s license for their inability to pay court debt confounds logic,
especially in a state like Tennessee where walking is not a viable option
to get to most destinations and the public transportation infrastructure
is unreliable.65 A federal judge acknowledged as much about Tennessee’s
former (and harsher) driver’s license suspension law:
What a suspension does do, however, is impose a significant ma-
terial hardship on the driver that is likely to make him less able
to develop the resources and, if possible, the economic self-suf-
ficiency necessary to pay the underlying debt. Suspending the
driver’s license of an indigent person because he has failed to pay
his traffic debt is not only wholly ineffective, but powerfully
counterproductive.66
The consequences that individuals with outstanding court debt face
are not trivial. There is certainly enough motivation to pay off the debt.
Because of this, the low rates of return in court debt across the state seem
to suggest that inability to pay is a more likely cause of nonpayment than
sheer unwillingness. That the great majority of individuals who cycle
through the criminal legal system are poor is further evidence that the
obstacle of inability to pay plays a central role in the phenomenon of
widespread nonpayment.67 This troubles the states’ justification for as-
sessing these costs on citizens altogether. Such low rates of return rela-
tive to the amounts actually assessed call into question the notion of
court debt as the reliable source of revenue that it was ostensibly created
to be. This is not to say that these small rates of return are always insig-
nificant dollar amounts. To the contrary, in large counties, such as
Shelby County, low returns still generate revenue in the millions of dol-
lars.68 The cost, however, of this practice is more significant. Saddling
individuals with debt that they are unable to pay and subsequently
65. See Robinson, 2018 WL 5023330, at *7.
66. Id. In partial response to the Robinson litigation, Tennessee amended its driver’s license
revocation statute in July 2019, though it did not eliminate all circumstances in which licenses
might be revoked for failure to pay. See Forester, supra note 33, at 261–62.
67. Joshi, supra note 9, at 19 (noting that 75% of individuals prosecuted in Tennessee are
indigent and unlikely to pay off their debt); Forester, supra note 33, at 259 (noting a 2015 local
investigative news report that showed one Tennessee County collected nearly $6 million in fees
and fines but had an outstanding balance of $555 million); NASHVILLE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra
note 19, at 12 (noting that it took on average four years for individuals to complete payment).
68. E.g., TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 161; see also NASHVILLE FINES & FEES
REPORT, supra note 19, at 13.
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holding their lives hostage for their inability to pay is a heavy burden for
citizens to bear, hardly justified by money received in government cof-
fers. Disrupting this practice is an important step toward divesting from
a parasitic, ever-growing criminal legal system weaponized to further
oppress the poor.
II. STRATEGIES FOR RELIEF
Structural change in Tennessee’s current system of assessing court
costs must come from the Tennessee General Assembly. All of the laws
that require the assessment of court costs or that allow local govern-
ments to assess court costs are products of that legislative body.69 Unfor-
tunately, while the General Assembly has demonstrated concern about
persistently rising court costs, their concern has not been followed up by
any change in the substantive law.70 To the contrary, the changes they
have made over the past two decades have only increased the court costs
assessed on individuals, particularly those in Tennessee’s criminal court
system.71 Saddled with these costs, Tennesseans are left with very few al-
ternatives to free themselves from these often-massive—especially to the
poor—debt burdens. Advocates for these issues have thus turned to more
local strategies for finding relief for individuals affected by these laws.
This Article discusses two such strategies: (1) partnering with other in-
terested stakeholders to relieve individuals of their court debt, and (2)
leveraging judicial discretion to waive court debt.
A. Community Partnership
Some of my clients have found relief through funds specifically cre-
ated to pay individuals’ court debt. These funds directly pay qualified in-
dividuals’ costs with the ultimate goal of expunging the individuals’ rec-
ords. The City of Memphis ran one of these funds, limited to individuals
that met their program-specific criteria.72 The program succeeded in
69. See TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
70. See id. at 1–2.
71. See TENNESSEE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1–2; Joshi, supra note 9, at 19–20
(summarizing legislative action on this front and arguing that “the state’s utilization of people in
the criminal system to fund courts and state budgets not only ties successful re-entry back to
society to wealth rather than rehabilitation, but it also engenders a system that creates revenue
for the greater public good at the expense of poor, minority populations.”).
72. SHELBY CNTY. GOV’T EX REL. GEN. SESSIONS CT. CLERK’S OFF. & CITY OF MEMPHIS,
INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (Dec. 20, 2018) (on file with author); CITY OF
MEMPHIS CITY COUNCIL MLK50 WORKSHOP, DRIVER’S LICENSE REINSTATEMENT AND DIVERSION FEE
PROGRAM (Mar. 28, 2018) (on file with author).
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helping individuals pay their court costs. I often referred some of my
own clients to this program when they could not, or were unlikely to, get
the relief they sought through judicial waiver. For example, one of my
clients with over $1,500 in unpaid court debt was able to use this fund
when his judge was willing to waive the debt only after he paid around
$300. This highlights the predatory nature of court debt, the failure of
the mechanism of judicial discretion, and the importance of alternatives
(such as relief funds) to help individuals burdened by court debt.
Sustainability is an obstacle for this solution. Programs of this type
only work when there is enough money to pay off people’s court debt.
When these funds dry up, however, individuals are left with few alterna-
tives. For this reason, funds of this sort might limit the amount that they
are willing to pay for an individual. The City of Memphis’ fund did this,
and only accepted applicants with costs at or below $1,200.73 While these
limits help to get as many people into the program as possible, they ex-
clude a significant number of people whose costs exceed their cap, such
as my client Mr. Smith. Additionally, these funds will inevitably dry up
unless they are continuously replenished. This happened with the City of
Memphis’ fund. Now, my clients that meet the program criteria and are
unable to get a judicial waiver have nowhere else to turn for relief from
their court debt.
This short-lived program provides an important lesson: individuals
can receive the debt relief they seek if other individuals or entities who
have the ability to provide that relief view their interests as aligned with
the cause. While the State of Tennessee is, at this point, unwilling to pro-
vide relief to the many people suffering under its anti-poor legislation,
the City of Memphis saw the value in its citizens no longer being bur-
dened by court debt. Creating a fund to relieve citizens of the burden of
their court debt helped people to free themselves from the grips of the
criminal legal system, giving the city more unencumbered workers and
eligible voters and fewer drivers on the streets with suspended licenses.
If the funding existed to scale up these programs, it could have a tremen-
dous aggregate impact and provide much-needed relief for more indi-
viduals. Getting more funding for programs like this requires highlight-
ing the harms that court costs have on individuals and the benefits that
relieving those individuals of their court debt would have for the com-
munity.
While this type of interest alignment and community partnership
would benefit community members saddled with court debt, it is im-
portant to recognize the costs of the State of Tennessee’s fines and fees
policy. That these programs are even necessary confounds the logic of a
“user-funded” system and reveals the emptiness of the broader practice
73. CITY OF MEMPHIS CITY COUNCIL MLK50 WORKSHOP, supra note 72.
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of assessing fines and fees on a population that is disproportionately in
poverty. Because courts impose these fees largely on “users” who are un-
able to pay them, other entities, such as the City of Memphis, are being
used to subsidize the operation of the criminal legal system. While the
City recognized the value in freeing its residents from significant debt
burdens that held back lives, moving public money from one government
entity to another hardly builds a compelling case for the practice of im-
posing fines and fees, or at least for doing so without a systematic
method for removing them when payment by an individual is not possi-
ble. The same is true for community partners other than the City of
Memphis. The creation of funds to free people from the burden of court
debt is of great value to the debt-burdened people, but it is a troubling
solution because it does not challenge the state power that is harming
Tennesseans. Ultimately, the greater benefit of the introduction of other
interested individuals into this issue area is the creation of more stake-
holders, some with power and influence, that could push for the elimi-
nation of court fines, fees, and taxes altogether.
B. Judicial Discretion
A number of statutes in the Tennessee Code grant judges discretion
in waiving court costs.74 Judges are relatively unrestricted in what they
can waive and when they can waive court debt.75 Additionally, there is no
avenue for appeal laid out in statute,76 and failure to waive costs for an
indigent criminal defendant is not considered an abuse of a trial judge’s
discretion.77 Thus, there is little oversight on how judges utilize this dis-
cretion. An individual petitioning the court to waive their court debt
might view such unrestricted discretion as the perfect avenue for relief.
It is true that a judge’s ability to waive court debt sometimes provides a
promising path for many a debt-burdened petitioner.78 This was, after
all, the way that my client, Mr. Smith, was able to get his more than
$10,000 court debt waived. A fuller look at how this broad discretion is
applied in Shelby County, however, reveals a lack of uniformity among
74. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-14-202, 40-24-102 , 40-24-104 , 40-25-123 , 39-17-428
(2021); see also State v. Whitehead, No. M2016-00160-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4135878, at *2 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Aug. 3, 2016) (dismissing appeal of denial of request for waiver of fees).
75. See, e.g., §§ 40-14-202, 40-24-102, 40-24-104, 40-25-123, 39-17-428; see also NASHVILLE
FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 19, at 7.
76. See, e.g., §§ 40-14-202, 40-24-102, 40-24-104, 40-25-123, 39-17-428; see also Whitehead, 2016
WL 4135878, at *2 (dismissing appeal of denial of request for waiver of fees).
77. State v. Black, 897 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tenn. 1995).
78. See NASHVILLE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 19, at 8 (noting that 56% of assessed fines
and fees were waived by judges in FY2018).
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judges and uncertainty for petitioners seeking to have their court debt
waived.
Of the nineteen judges that handle criminal matters in Shelby
County, I have appeared before thirteen of them to petition for waiver of
my clients’ court debt. While some judges liberally waive all or most of
my clients’ court debt with little probe into their personal finances, oth-
ers waive debt only for individuals who meet very specific criteria. For
example, one judge only waives petitioners’ court debt if they are receiv-
ing monthly Social Security Disability payments, the rationale being that
if individuals are physically able to earn an income, they will be able to
pay their court costs. Another judge grants waivers only to petitioners
who are veterans or current students. Generally, most judges only waive
costs when they feel that the petitioner has made sufficient effort to pay
off the costs, which typically requires that the petitioner pay between $50
and $500, depending on the total costs assessed. Because waiver hear-
ings must take place in the courtroom through which the underlying
criminal case proceeded,79 clients with similar circumstances get dissim-
ilar results depending on the whims of the judge before whom they peti-
tion.80
Of the individuals at Just City found to be expungement-eligible
through the Clean Slate Fund, 46% have court costs that bar them from
accessing their expungement 81 Most of these candidates find out when
they apply that they owe court debt that is keeping them from having
their records expunged. In the past year, I have handled approximately
79. While state statutes grant judges the ability to waive court debt, local court processes
prohibit cost waiver petitioners from “forum shopping” by requiring that their petitions be heard
in the courtrooms out of which they originated. TENN. R. CRIM. P. 18(a) (“Except as otherwise
provided by statute or by these rules, offenses shall be prosecuted in the county where the offense
was committed.”). The rigidity of this process is also notable during times when courts are closed
or in-person hearings are severely restricted, like during the COVID-19 pandemic.
80. See LFOS IN THE TENN. CRIM. JUST. SYS., supra note 24, at 19–20. The report summarizes
the inconsistent and largely ineffective procedures for an indigent defendant to receive relief from
fines and fees in Tennessee: “Experts, however, pointed to the difficulty of establishing indigency
status in courts. The process is neither straight-forward nor user-friendly and defendants often
lack legal counsel. Courts do not have the time, information and resources to conduct individual
investigations into whether a defendant can afford to pay LFOs. Further, judges vary in their
willingness to waive debt, with many opting to create long-term payment plans. Commentators
have observed variation in practices between urban centers and rural counties, such that the ques-
tion of whether the poor have to pay—and if they do, how much—can ultimately end up becoming
a matter of geography or the particular court.” LFOS IN THE TENN. CRIM. JUST. SYS., supra note 24,
at 19–20.
81. Just City calculated this percentage by using numbers in its client database. The Clean
Slate Fund at Just City is a program designed to determine applicants’ eligibility for expungement,
help them understand the expungement process, and navigate it with them. See Clean Slate Fund,
JUST CITY, https://justcity.org/what-we-do/clean-slate-fund [https://perma.cc/NTV6-WRYJ] (last
visited May 5, 2021).
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thirty-five petitions for waiver of court costs, with associated debts rang-
ing from around $500 to over $10,000 per petitioner. Of these petitions,
twenty-nine individuals succeeded in having all or most of their debts
waived. While this is a great victory for my twenty-nine clients, they rep-
resent only a small portion of the people in need of this type of assistance.
There are over 550 additional individuals that have applied to Just City’s
Clean Slate Fund and meet the criteria for expungement, but who none-
theless are barred from accessing their expungement due to their sub-
stantial court debts. This highlights the limitations of judicial waiver to
provide mass relief under Tennessee law and court policy and the sub-
stantial need that remains unmet.
Judicial discretion, though undoubtedly beneficial for some clients,
is an imperfect solution. Relying on such discretion puts clients at the
mercy of the individual judge’s inclinations and often removes the actual
petitioner’s financial capacity from the decision-making process.82 In
this way, judicial discretion provides a remedy short of what petitioners
seek and less than what the statutes’ broad language is intended to pro-
vide. Still, because there is no promise of a more fundamental change in
the legislation that would result in less burdensome costs for clients, ag-
gressively utilizing judicial discretion becomes a critical path for the re-
lief our clients seek.83 In turn, it is the job of advocates to make this path
a more viable option for more people.
One way of accomplishing this is through long-term strategic en-
gagement with judges, aimed at getting more judges to waive more court
debt. While I bring court cost waiver petitions in the courtroom on an
individual basis, I, along with a coalition of interested stakeholders, also
consider other avenues to demonstrate to judges the plight of debt-rid-
den individuals. While this team is only at the beginning of this engage-
ment strategy, we have contemplated how we might ethically lobby
judges to use the judicial waiver more widely across the criminal courts.
Avenues through which we seek to advance this goal include continuing
legal education trainings, group discussions with judges, and partner-
ships with other stakeholders in the community—like elected officials
and members of the business community—to whom the judges are more
beholden. As an advocate for clients who could benefit from effective
representation before a judge, I must be mindful to ensure that alterna-
tive forms of advocacy do not negatively impact my clients. Though I am
an advocate for the elimination of court debt, getting individual relief for
clients is my first priority. Strategizing public pressure campaigns while
82. There are no statutory factors guiding judicial discretion in making a waiver decision.
Joshi, supra note 9, at 21.
83. See NASHVILLE FINES & FEES REPORT, supra note 19, at 17 (including in its calls for action
coordination by judges, clerks, and district attorneys to maximize discretion in granting waivers).
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also appearing before the targets of this pressure is a delicate balance
that has the potential to put my clients’ relief in jeopardy. Thus, these
strategies have to be considered carefully and executed intentionally to
benefit individuals who are typically never benefited in the criminal legal
system.
Durham, North Carolina provides an example of judicial waiver be-
ing used to provide large-scale relief to debt-burdened individuals.
There, the District Attorney partnered with a community-based collabo-
rative to have the debt of 11,000 residents waived between 2018 and
2020.84 This significant undertaking was first initiated by the local com-
munity group Durham Expunction and Restoration Program,85 and
eventually scaled up into a larger community-wide initiative.86 Addition-
ally, this effort was undertaken in spite of the North Carolina legisla-
ture’s disapproval of such actions.87 In 2015, North Carolina legislators
passed a statute that requires the North Carolina Administrative Office
of the Courts to report how many court costs, fines, and fees are waived,
by district and by judge.88 This resulted in a sharp decline in the number
of court debt waivers issued in the state.89 Despite the State’s efforts,
however, Durham leaders in partnership with community stakeholders
were able to get approximately $2.7 million in court debt waived.90 Their
work is instructive for local actors in Tennessee and across the country
seeking relief for clients through similar means.
CONCLUSION
Court debt is only one of many ways that the criminal legal system
causes harm to individuals that make contact with it. Of course, assessed
court costs and the consequences of outstanding court debt are not the
harshest repercussions that the criminal legal system doles out. Still,
84. News Release: DEAR Program Extends Court Debt Relief to 11,000 Residents with Suspended Li-
censes, CITY OF DURHAM (Oct. 26, 2020), https://durhamnc.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/5003
[https://perma.cc/UX9Y-7UM8] [hereinafter News Release].
85. About DEAR, CITY OF DURHAM, https://www.deardurham.org/about [https://perma.cc/AQQ7-
3Y9B] (last visited May 5, 2020) (“DEAR is a collaboration of local government, court, and commu-
nity actors who together embrace a vision for a court system that ensures all parties, regardless
of race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation or income, have equal access to the legal relief guar-
anteed by law, and vision for a city that believes in second chances.”).
86. See News Release, supra note 84.
87. Melissa Boughton, ACLU Report: NC Court Fines, Fees Create Modern-Day Debtors’ Prison,
N.C. POL’Y WATCH (Apr. 17, 2019), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2019/04/17/aclu-report-nc-
court-fines-fees-create-modern-day-debtors-prison [https://perma.cc/V2W3-9P22].
88. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-350 (2021).
89. See Boughton, supra note 87.
90. News Release, supra note 84.
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they are consequences worth discussing, not only because they impact
large numbers of people, but also because court debt has facilitated the
growth of our criminal legal system and allowed for the exploitation of
more people in its ambit. Imagine a system that did not seek to further
complicate the lives of people in our communities, including those who
themselves cause harm, but sought to address the needs of those indi-
viduals. Not only is our criminal legal system not doing this, but it is af-
firmatively adding obstacles that set back individuals that interact with
it. One of these obstacles is court debt and its attendant prohibitions. As
I continue to work to relieve clients of their individual debt burdens and
change policies in the state, I also fight to create a system that meets the
needs of its people, instead of creating more need.
